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ABSTRACT
Due to its ever growing complexity, software is and will prob-
ably never be 100% bug-free and secure. Therefore in most
cases, software companies publish updates regularly. For the
lack of time or care, or maybe because stopping an applica-
tion is annoying, such updates are rarely, if ever, deployed
on users’ machines.
We propose an integrated tool allowing system administra-
tors to deploy critical security updates on the fly on appli-
cations running remotely and without the intervention of
the end-user. Our approach is based on Arachne, an as-
pect weaving system that dynamically rewrites binary code.
Hence applications are still running while they are updated.
Our second tool Minerve integrates Arachne within the stan-
dard updating process: Minerve takes a patch produced by
diff, a tool that lists textual differences between two ver-
sions of a file, and eventually builds a dynamic patch that
can later be woven to update the application on the fly. In
addition, by translating patches into aspects and thus gener-
ating a more abstract presentation of the changes, Minerve
eases auditing tasks.
1. INTRODUCTION
Despite the availability of correcting patches, in 2003, 80% of
computer attacks exploited already published security vul-
nerabilities [3]. Sasser for example is not an exception - the
patch preventing its propagation was available two weeks
before it spread all over the world. Thus, most threats
could be avoided by strict tracking of security bulletins and
quick updating of security vulnerabilities. System adminis-
trators can not achieve these tasks without adequate tools.
Indeed, reading the 5500 security alerts annually published
by the CERT/CC (assuming 5 minutes per bulletin) would
require about 13 weeks of work. If only one percent of the
reported vulnerabilities were relevant, if the computer net-
work is composed of one hundred machines and if updating
one machine takes about an hour, deploying patches would
require 157 weeks per year [2]. And this evaluation neglects
the time spend in negotiations with end users to stop their
applications during updates.
In this paper, we propose a semi automatic approach to
deploy security updates. Its goal is to reduce the required
time while still allowing system administrators to protect
their network efficiently. Our framework is based on two
tools, Minerve and Arachne [13]. The first reduces the time
spent to audit and to adapt the patch by translating regular
patches into aspect source code. The second is a dynamic
weaver that deploys the translated patches on the fly freeing
administrators from the hassle of negotiating with users.
This paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes a
global view of our framework and shows how it integrates
itself in the usual patch deployment process. Sections 3 and
4 present Minerve and Arachne respectively. Section 5 sum-
marizes our experimental results and presents a complete
example. Sections 6 and 7 discuss benefits of AOP for dy-
namic patching and the future work. Section 8 concludes.
2. THE FRAMEWORK
Within the open source community, security holes are cor-
rected through the distribution of patches. A patch is pro-
duced with the diff tool [6], it traces the differences between
the source of the old vulnerable version of the application
and the source of the patched one. Hence upon a patch
publication, administrators are left with no option but re-
compiling and redeploying the application.
Redeploying a software is very expensive with respect to
time and resource consumption. First, the system adminis-
trator has to review the patch to check whether it can be
trusted or not. This review is difficult as patches are not
meant to be read and solely composed of the lines of source
code that are different between the vulnerable version and
the version of the patch. While patches stress the differ-
ences between two versions, they do not help administrators
to understand the impact of the changes on the application.
Secondly, patches are effective only once the application has
been recompiled, redeployed and relaunched. But stopping
or even suspending an application is often uncomfortable or
simply impossible. Small companies running their own e-
commerce site can not afford the additional costs a proper
fault tolerant system forgiving temporarily unavailability of
a single machine. In a roaming or mobile context, it is hard
to believe that even a fault tolerant approach would ever be
a solution.
The framework we propose in this paper aims at both re-
ducing the time spent in administrative tasks and decreasing
the resources required to update an application on the fly.
It is worth noticing that fault tolerant approaches meet the
second objective but not the first. Our approach is based on
two tools: Minerve and Arachne. Minerve is a patch trans-
former. Its input is a diff-like patch. Minerve outputs a
series of aspects written in the Arachne aspect language [4].
The use of an aspect language clearly presents the modifica-
tions made by the patch. Such a clear presentation decreases
the time required to audit the patch. Moreover, prior to the
generation of the aspect source code, Minerve checks that
the new patch can be deployed dynamically without leading
to an incoherent execution .
Once the system administrator has validated the new patch,
our second tool, Arachne comes into action. Arachne is a
run-time aspect weaver for C applications. Pre-installed on
every computer of the network, Arachne dynamically weaves
the patch provided by Minerve into the running program.
Modifications are injected atomically ensuring the consis-
tency of the running program.
The modifications carried out by the patch are taken into
account immediately without stopping the services provided
by the program or losing current work for the end-user. Nev-
ertheless, modifications are only made on the running pro-
cess, thus our framework should be complemented with a
usual patching like it can be done with static patch deploy-
ing tools [8], in order for the modifications to be permanent.
3. MINERVE, PATCH ANALYSIS AND TRANS-
FORMATION
Source patches provided by developers are usually generated
and deployed using tools like diff and patch. diff simply
lists line by line textual differences between the two ver-
sions of every source file of a program. Thus this tool does
not provide much information about the semantics of the
modifications. patch does the opposite work by injecting
differences listed into the source of the application.
In a static update process, the contents of the patch is par-
tially validated by the compilation process. But this off-line
verification does not apply to a dynamic update (on-line).
From the original source code, Minerve is in charge of re-
trieving information about the modifications contained in
the patch. This additional information permits to verify the
dynamic applicability of the patch, and to produce an ex-
pressive dynamic patch that can be validated by the system
administrator.
In the rest of this section, we will present how Minerve ex-
tracts, transforms and validates a patch according to the
original source code of a program. In order to demonstrate
the feasibility of our approach, we reviewed security holes af-
fecting ANSI C applications running under the GNU Linux
operating system on an IA32 platform. It is also important
to note that Minerve does not verify the static correctness
of a patch but only validates its dynamic applicability.
3.1 Modification analysis
Minerve’s first task is to classify modifications contained in
a patch. As we focus on applications written in C, we enu-
merated all possible modifications that could be applied at
run-time. C is a typed, procedural language with side ef-
fects. We distinguish two kinds of types: simple types cor-
responding to entities that can be manipulated efficiently by
the processor, e.g. int, and complex types made up of other
types. A source patch can modify a program behavior in
two ways. First, by modifying the mechanisms it contains
(functions). Second, by changing type definitions of the data
it manipulates (variables). From a static point of view, this
distinction is unnecessary but it is essential to update ap-
plication on the fly since compiled code of function bodies
is usually kept in read only memory while data is not.
3.1.1 Possible modifications
Three kinds of modifications can occur: a patch can add, re-
move, or replace a function. Minerve treats the addition and
the removal of a function as if they were function replace-
ments. Indeed, adding a function in a running application is
useless if the patch does not add another function that use
it.
Replacing a function f by another function f ′ can possibly
modify the prototype of f . This case can be seen as the
addition of a new function f ′ while modifying all calls to
f . Furthermore, when a patch replaces an existing function
without changing its signature, the updating process has to
guarantee that the original function is not executing at the
time it is updated [7, 12]. In order to ensure this condition,
we rely on Arachne’ mechanisms presented in Section 4.
In order to ensure the coherency of the program, the replace-
ment of a function f by f ′ must be done atomically. For this
we rely on Arachne. Nevertheless this is not sufficient. In-
deed to ensure coherency of the application when replacing
a function, the new version f ′ should not read data writ-
ten directly or indirectly by the execution of f because in
certain cases this could lead to an incoherency. In order to
ensure this, we chose to examine statically the new function
f ′ to determine if it might use data produced by f . We use
an ad hoc source code parser to check that property.
3.1.2 Modifying data’s type definition
In this section we distinguish modifications made on basic
types from the ones made on complex types.
Two operations have to be executed on a simple type redef-
inition of a variable. First, updating the value hold by the
variable. Second, modifying the code that manipulates the
variable. When increasing the capacity of a variable with-
out changing its numerical type (eg: short → long int), no
conversion problem can occur as the new type can always
hold the current value. However, diminishing the capac-
ity of a variable (eg: long int → short), or modifying the
numerical type of the variable (eg: int → float), can only
be done if the current value can be contained in the new
type definition or if a conversion formula is provided. If it
is possible to transfer the current value of the variable, the
code manipulating it must be updated too. Indeed assembly
opcodes, registers, processor flags and exceptions triggered
may vary according to the size and type of operands to be
manipulated. Consequently, this modification may affect
surrounding instructions. In order to handle this situation
generally, our tool recompiles the entire function being mod-
ified. In certain cases this might not be sufficient. Indeed, as
specified in the System V Application Binary Interface [14],
the responsibility of saving floating point registers belongs
to the calling function, and thus modifying a variable from
type int to float requires modifying the code of the calling
function. Nevertheless, this case is handled by Arachne and
thus modifications are always limited to the function that
accesses the modified variable.
A program’s behavior can also be altered by modifying a
variable of a complex type definition. In this paper, we
only present the addition of a new field in a structured type
as it is relevant to modifications that can be made (addi-
tion, deletion, replacement). At the processor level, alter-
ation of a structured type can modify alignment constraints
on variables of that type. Some assembly instructions can
have a different behavior and even not work at all when the
operand they manipulate does not respect these constraints
[9]. Thus, our updating process does not modify the base
program code which continues to manipulate the original
definition. Only the code added is aware of the new field
and thus is translated to access it via a hash table indexed
with the original variable’s address. This solution allows us
to ensure coherency of the base program without stopping
it, nor needing to update all the variable at once.
3.2 Patch auditing
There are two reasons for auditing patches: to ensure that
the vulnerability is really corrected, and to check that the
code added by the patch does not include a new vulner-
ability. It can also be necessary to adapt the patch to a
specific security policy. As an example, many specialists
advise inserting an alarm associated with an Intrusion De-
tection System (IDS) in addition to the patch, in order to
detect exploitation attempts [11]. The use of Arachne’s as-
pect language make it easy for the system administrator to
the add code triggering the IDS inside the patch.
Contrary to diff that gives very little information on the
modifications contained in a patch and that presents them in
a very low-level line-by-line manner, Minerve translates the
patch into Arachne’s aspect language. This more abstract
representation of the modifications lists all functions, vari-
ables and type definitions that have been altered and their
respective new version and thus eases the comprehension.
Arachne’s aspect language offers an efficient join point model
and high level constructs that allow to easily benefit from
aspect-oriented programming [4]. Nevertheless, the dynamic
patching of security violations does not make full usage of
the higher level constructs.
4. ARACHNE, DYNAMIC PATCH INJEC-
TION
In this Section, we present tools provided by Arachne that
allow compiling and injecting patches into a running appli-
cation.
4.1 Compilation and deployment
Arachne provides an aspect compiler and a run-time weaver.
The aspect compiler, acc, transforms aspect source code
into a native shared library. The run-time weaver, weave,
injects this library inside the application. In addition to
the verifications that are made by Minerve, acc ensures the
dynamic patch is syntactically correct. At injection time,
weave checks that references made to the application by the
patch exist, partially ensuring that the patch corresponds
to the right application version. Even if the patch com-
prises multiples aspects or rewriting points, the rewriting
strategies of Arachne ensure the coherency of the applica-
tion during the injection. Moreover, Arachne guarantes that
on failure of the weaving process, the application remains
unchanged.
4.2 Arachne inside
Arachne’s weaver is used via the weave command, it rewrites
application binary code at run-time in order to inject the
aspects. This section focus on the mechanisms provided by
Arachne, used by Minerve. A complete description of all of
Arachne’s mechanisms is available in previous publication
[13]. On a Pentium processor a function call is translated
into binary code as a single instruction, call, with an ad-
dress as operand. Arachne disassembles binary code in order
to find calls. To associate a function name with an address,
Arachne parses the application symbol table that has been
produced by the C compiler. At weaving time, Arachne
loads the aspect library in to the memory of the application
and rewrites previously found calls to redirect the control
path to the appropriate functions in the library. A similar
technique is used to rewrite accesses to variables in the heap.
Some considerations are problematic during the process we
just described. Indeed, the process must guarantee the co-
herency of the application during the weaving. Basically, no
added code should be executed before every aspect is fully
woven into the program. Moreover Arachne must overcome
memory isolation mechanisms and consider performance is-
sues. Arachne solves the coherency issue by the use of
locks and dynamically generated hooks that save and re-
store the program state. To circumvent the memory isola-
tion, Arachne uses debugging support to insert itself inside
the process’s memory space.
5. EVALUATION
In this section, we have evaluate of our framework. We have
applied our framework to all security advisories concerning
open source C softwares published by the CERT since 2002.
After a brief presentation of the CERT, we present our re-
sults over the whole test suite, and one complete example.
5.1 Test suite
CERT stands for ”Computer Emergency Response Team /
Coordination Center”. It was created in November 1988 af-
ter the appearance of the Morris worm. It aims at training
and warning about internet computing security. Its age and
its independence from software editors make the CERT an
international reference in security. Since 1988, it has col-
lected an accurate database of vulnerabilities reported in
softwares. We made our evaluation over all major vulnera-
bilities (CERT Advisories) reported in open source software
since 2002. This period counts a total of 67 advisories. 30%
of these concern Microsoft products, 20% other proprietary
products, 10% concern embedded softwares and finally 40%
open source softwares. In these last 14 advisories, we ne-
glected 2 because they were affecting unavailable versions of
the software.
In the considered vulnerabilities, about half of them are
buffer overflows, 20% are format string bugs, 10% are double
free bugs, 5% are integer overflows, and finally the remaining
ones are combinations of the 4 previously cited. All these
bugs are mainly based on assertions made by the develop-
ers on the input that are not verified at execution. Thus
these vulnerabilities can be easily corrected by adding tests
on input data. We verified this when auditing the patches
provided by the developers for these security advisories. In-
deed 90% of the patches contain modifications of function
code without changing prototypes and only 10% modify type
definitions.
Our experiments show that our approach can be applied
successfully to all the security advisories considered.
5.2 Example
In this section, we present a full example from our test suite.
The vulnerability it concerns was published in June 2002
under the reference CA-2002-18 by the CERT. The software
affected is the communication server openSSH. An integer
overflow might be exploited in authentication functions of
the SSH2 protocol in versions from 2.3.1p1 to 3.3. It might
allow the execution of arbitrary code on the targeted host.
5.2.1 The source patch
The source patch provided by the openSSH development
team modifies two functions of sshd: input userauth info -
response and input userauth info response pam. The modifi-
cations only add tests on the parameter nresp. When the
parameter is invalid, the patch calls the function fatal to
terminate the program. As shown in listing 1, the patch
does not offer much information about the semantic of the
modification and useful information can only be obtained by
looking at the program source code.
5.2.2 The dynamic patch
Minerve transforms the source patch into a dynamic patch
that essentially contains a collection of aspects that are
meant to replace vulnerable functions by their safe version.
Minerve names the new and safe functions by adding the
suffix ” new” to their original name. As a function can be
called in sshd (as for any application) via a direct call or
via the use of a function pointer, it is necessary to produce
two aspects in order to replace any kind of call to the re-
placed function. The listing 2 shows this two aspects for the
original function input userauth info response.
The pointcut of the aspect ReplaceFunctionCall traps ev-
ery call made with a constant address to the old function
(line 2). The advice call the new version with the same pa-
rameters (line 3). Thus this aspect replaces every direct call
to the function with the call to its safe version. In a similar
way the second aspect, Replacepointer (line 5) traps every
read access to the address of input userauth info response
(line 6) and returns in place of it the address of the safe
version (line 7). Thus any future indirect call to input -
userauth info response will be replaced by its new version.
As shown in listing 2, patches produced by Minerve ease the
audit by describing modifications of the application in a lan-
guage close to C. Our experiments show that the framework
offers a significant reduction of the time spend to deploy
patches. Indeed, excluding network transfer time, Arachne
updates an application in less than 250µs. And because up-
dates are made in parallel on the entire network, the time
for applying the update is independent of the network size.
6. DISCUSSION AND RELATED WORK
We intended this work in order to evaluate whether Aspect
Oriented Programming in suitable for dynamic patching. It
is legitimate to wonder what is the benefit of AOP in this
field. We already pointed that during our experiments, Min-
erve did not make full use of Arachne’s aspect language con-
structs. There are two reasons for this. First, because it is a
complex task to analyze an application source code in order
to infer high level rules about the modifications made by
patches. Second, for most part, security patches are written
in emergency. Then modifications are often limited to a sin-
gle test where the vulnerability might appear, thus making
patches less crosscutting. Nevertheless, our experiment on
larger patches show an interesting potential for AOP.
To our knowledge, no other work provides both coherency
analysis and dynamic updating. Previous work has focused
on determining when in the execution flow an update may be
applied safely [7], without the ability to guarantee that such
a moment is reachable. In contrast to this, our approach
tries to determine the applicability of a patch independently
of the execution.
Dynamic patching also benefits from AOP because aspects
are far more comprehensive than patches, indeed, reason-
ing about the program execution is easier than on its code.
Also, AOP is more appropriate for dynamic patching than
binary rewriting APIs like Dyninst [1] or Vulcan [5]. First,
aspect code is far more intuitive to read than a program.
Second, when using binary rewriting APIs, the developer
is responsible to ensure the program won’t behave abnor-
mally whereas our dynamic weaver, Arachne, ensures that
modifications are made atomically.
7. FUTURE WORK
Our analysis of dynamic applicability of patches are for now
limited to simple cases, mainly due to source code parsing.
It is necessary to base our analysis on higher level represen-
tation of source code in order to avoid this limitation. Thus,
we plan to use the type propagation tool Lackwit [10].
For technical reasons our framework is limited to open source
C applications running on Linux, IA-32 architecture. Nev-
ertheless, as compiled aspects are independent of the wo-
ven program, there is no restrictions for software editors to
diffuse Arachne compiled patches to be applied on binary
distributed programs. This would permit dynamic patching
without needing the application’s source code. We also plan
to adapt our framework to integrate other languages and
platforms and to apply it to kernel code in the near future.
8. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have presented a novel approach for se-
curity updates based on a framework for dynamic software
updates. Our first tool Minerve determines whether a patch
can be deployed on the fly. The use of an aspect language
authctxt ->postponed = 0; /* reset */
2 nresp = packet_get_int ();
+ if (nresp > 100)
4 + fatal("input_userauth_info_response : nresp too big  %u", nresp );
if (nresp > 0) {
6 response = xmalloc (nresp * sizeof (char *));
for (i = 0; i < nresp ; i++)
Listing 1: The source patch correcting the vulnerability CA-2002-18
ReplaceFunctionCall :
2 call(void input_userauth_info_response (int , u_int32_t , void *)) && args(type , seq , ctxt)
then input_userauth_info_response_new (type , seq , ctxt);
4
ReplacePointer :
6 readGlobal (void* ( input_userauth_info_response )(int , u_int32_t , void *))
then return &input_userauth_info_response_new ;
Listing 2: The aspect patch correcting the vulnerability CA-2002-18
allows administrators to validate more rapidly patches. Our
second tool, Arachne applies patches dynamically without
data loses and makes security updates effective immediately.
Moreover our framework can easily be integrated in the
static update process as it accepts standard patches pub-
lished by software developers.
Despite the potential existence of patches that might not
be translated in dynamically injectable aspects, our frame-
work is efficient enough to be applied successfully on all the
security advisories published by the CERT since 2002.
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